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1 Executive Summary 
The electricity sector in Bangladesh has been facing unprecedented challenges, with severe capacity 
constraints and sector subsidies that quadrupled from 0.2 percent to 0.8 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) between 2010 and 2012, driving the government’s fiscal deficit deeper. Rising global 
energy prices and high-cost rental power plants have increased the fiscal burden of maintaining 
electricity subsidies that have been in place for decades. In response, the government of Bangladesh has 
been undertaking a series of difficult reforms for the sector.  
This policy note examines the poverty and distribution impact of one such reform – residential 
electricity tariff increases - along with their fiscal implications. A challenge of such adjustments is how to 
minimize their impact on the poor and vulnerable. Using household survey data, this report studies the 
distributional and fiscal implications of the residential tariff adjustments between March 2010 and 
March 2012 on to inform policy dialogue on the provision and targeting of electricity subsidies. 
An important determinant of how effective subsidies can be to protect the poor is the level of access to 
electricity among poor households. According to HIES 2010, just over half of the population in 
Bangladesh had access to electricity in 2010 (55 percent). Rural access to electricity remains very low (42 
percent), and is even lower among households in the poorest quintile (21 percent). This means that 
using electricity subsidies as a social protection mechanism is automatically limited: very low levels of 
access among poor households mean changes in electricity tariffs and subsidies will not affect them. 
Electricity subsidies are defined as the difference between the cost of supplying a unit of electricity and 
the tariff the end-user is charged for a given unit. Between 2010 and 2012, real cost of supply increased 
almost 20 percent. On the transition from underpricing to cost recovery tariffs, real tariffs more than 
doubled for high levels of consumption, while they actually fell for low levels of consumption. The 
combined impact of these changes meant that in both 2010 and 2012, almost all units of electricity 
consumed (80–90 percent) were subsidized to some extent, limiting the ability to offset the fiscal 
burden through cross-subsidies from high consumers to low consumers. 
In 2010, the average unit of electricity was subsidized 25 percent, which remained constant in 2012. For 
low levels of consumption—where the majority of households consume—virtually stagnant real tariffs 
coupled with a soaring real cost of supply mean that the degree of subsidy provided on each unit of 
electricity has almost doubled in real terms. On the other hand, the cross-subsidy provided through high 
levels of consumption increased dramatically with the removal of slab benefits.  
There was an unequal distribution of subsidy benefits in 2010. The significant leakage suggests the 
structure of tariffs and subsidies is not pro-poor. Households in the richest quintile receive subsidy 
benefits that are seven times more than households in the poorest quintile (42 percent versus 6 
percent). Leakage of subsidies improved between 2010 and 2012, mainly driven by the removal of slab 
benefits for higher levels of consumption, meaning households in the richest quintile provided cross-
subsidies to households in lower quintiles.  
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The fiscal deficit in Bangladesh is forecasted to increase from 3.1 percent of GDP in fiscal year (FY) 2010 
to 4.4 percent of GDP in FY2012. Subsidies to the power sector are an important factor in this increase. 
The fiscal burden of electricity subsidies provided to residential customers increased by over 40 percent 
in real terms between 2010 and 2012.  
This policy note focuses on just one part of a much broader and complex system of connected energy 
policies. The policy implications of this analysis should only be considered in light of this broader 
context. In particular, this note does not study in detail the complex issues of generation and 
operational efficiency (in transmission and distribution). The public debate on these topics is particularly 
strong, with a sizeable portion of voices arguing that the government should not make households pay 
for generation and operational inefficiencies.  
Second, this note does not study the political economy of tariff and subsidy reform. Tariff increases have 
been a source of social unrest, and planned increases could generate additional unrest. It will be 
important for the government to consider the political economy of further reform carefully. In 
particular, care should be taken to communicate and educate the public on what changes are planned, 
the rationale for such changes, and what improvements households can expect as a result of these 
changes.  
Moving forward, both of the new slab systems being discussed could relieve the fiscal burden of 
subsidies. In the medium term, generation and operational efficiency gains would help reduce leakage 
and fiscal burden. This analysis suggests that if the government could bring supply costs back down to 
2010 levels, the fiscal burden would be reduced by more than 50 percent. In the long term, as 
Bangladesh moves toward universal access, it will be important for the government to offset the 
increased fiscal burden of having more households connected. Below poverty line tariffs, the seven and 
nine slab system, and reduced costs of supply could all help achieve the dual policy goal of well-targeted 
subsidies and low-to-zero fiscal burden. In the best-case scenario, the structure of tariffs and subsidies 
could actually generate a net fiscal contribution, creating resources for future investments in 
infrastructure.  
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2 Introduction 
The electricity sector in Bangladesh has been facing unprecedented challenges. Despite aggressive 
efforts to increase generation capacity, demand continues to outstrip supply, leading to continued load 
shedding and blackouts. Soaring costs of electricity supply, driven by the high cost of quick-fix rental 
power plants, are forcing tariff increases and leading to increased social unrest. Yet tariff increases have 
not kept up with this cost of supply, leading to a ballooning in the fiscal burden of electricity subsidies, 
which has increased fivefold from Tk 12 billion in FY2010 to Tk 60 billion in FY2012 (and is forecasted to 
be Tk 56 billion in FY2013). 
Electricity subsidies are a key element in the broader fiscal deficit. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimations for Bangladesh, the fiscal deficit will increase from 3.1 percent of GDP 
in FY2010 to 4.4 percent of GDP in FY20121. A key driver of this increasing deficit is subsidies provided 
for various needs in the country. As illustrated in figure 1, the total cost of subsidies has more than 
doubled, from around 1.5 percent in FY2010 to more than 3.5 percent of GDP in FY2012. One of the 
most important subsidies that has increased is electricity, which between FY2010 and FY2012 increased 
from 0.2 percent of GDP to 0.8 percent of GDP.2  
Figure 1: Fiscal balance and fiscal cost of subsidies 
  
The question of electricity tariffs and subsidies is just one policy choice in a balancing act of 
interconnected—but sometimes competing—policy goals across multiple sectors (figure 2). On one 
hand, there are a range of policy goals including universal access, reliable electricity supply, and 
affordable electricity. On the other hand, there are the fiscal implications of achieving each of these 
goals and the desire to have well-targeted social protection with minimal leakage to rich households. To 
succeed in this balancing act, the government has a range of policy choices available, including, but not 
limited to, infrastructure investments and the structure of tariffs and subsidies. Underpinning these 
choices is the political economy of policy reform.  
  
                                                          
1
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Figure 2: Policy Framework 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration 
 
In this challenging context, this policy note adds to the policy dialogue already underway in Bangladesh 
by providing evidence-based analysis that can inform decision making. This note uses household survey 
data (HIES 2010) combined with electricity data inputs such as tariff structures.3 Specifically, the four 
objectives of this note are to:  
i) estimate the distribution of electricity subsidies provided to residential customers;  
ii) estimate how this distribution has changed between 2010 and 2012, during which time 
there have been significant changes in underlying tariffs and costs of supply;  
iii) estimate how the fiscal burden of the subsidies provided to residential customers has 
changed between 2010 and 2012; and finally  
iv) analyze the potential impact of various policy options. 
The primary audience for this poverty and social impact analysis is the regulator (BERC) with the 
responsibility for setting tariffs. The secondary audience includes the Ministry of Finance which pays for 
the many of the subsidies in the energy sector, and the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral 
Resources, and the Ministry of Social Welfare which oversees many of the social protection systems in 
Bangladesh.  
This policy note focuses on residential electricity consumption, and does not include subsidies provided 
to other parts of the economy such as agriculture, and small businesses. As shown in figure 3, residential 
electricity consumption accounts for the majority of electricity consumption. Broader analysis of the 
energy sector is important (such as cost recovery in the electricity sector overall) but is beyond the 
scope of this analysis. Deep analysis of the political economy issues underlying policy choices and 
broader questions in the electricity sector, especially on issues such as efficiency in the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity, are also beyond the scope of this policy note.
                                                          
3
 See annex 2 for methodology. 
Policy Choices / Tools
• Infrastructure investments
• Structure of tariffs and subsidies
POLITICAL ECONOMY
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Figure 3: Electricity consumption by customer type, FY12 
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3 Electricity Subsidies and the Key Elements of the Electricity Sector  
This section provides an overview of some of the key elements of the electricity sector in Bangladesh as 
they relate to the benefits-incidence analysis and fiscal burden of electricity subsidies.4 This includes 
some of the important goals in the policy context; factors that affect the usefulness of subsidies as a 
social protection mechanism, including access and consumption profiles; and elements that determine 
subsidies, including cost of electricity supply and tariff levels.  
To understand how effective electricity subsidies can be as a tool for providing protection to poor 
households in Bangladesh, it is important to understand patterns of electricity consumption. The 
subsections that follow illustrate two powerful points:  
i) electricity subsidies have a limited role in providing protection when very few poor 
households have access to electricity; and 
ii) the benefit of limiting the fiscal cost of subsidies through cross-subsidization from richer 
households (consuming in higher tariff slabs) is small—if not redundant—when 
consumption is so low that no households consume enough to provide a cross-subsidy. 
3.1 Policy context 
The objectives of the government of Bangladesh’s (GOB, 2002) “Vision and Policy Statement” on power 
sector reforms are, among others, to:  
i) bring the entire country under electricity service by the year 2020, with improved reliability 
and quality;  
ii) increase the sector’s efficiency and make the power sector financially viable; and 
iii) make the sector commercial and increase private sector participation. 
As a key element of (i) above, Bangladesh has a very active Rural Electrification Program (REP)5. This 
initiative aims to increase power generation and to reduce the country's power shortage significantly in 
coming years, with a goal of achieving universal electrification by 2020. The progress of rural 
electrification in villages has been significant, with 53,281 villages connected and a total of 266,460 
kilometers (km) of line constructed.6 
3.2 Installed capacity and sources of fuel 
Along with the REP has been a parallel investment in generation capacity. The GOB has embarked upon 
an ambitious generation expansion plan that envisages doubling the supply capacity to the national grid 
                                                          
4
 Additional background information on the electricity sector can be found in the annexes. 
5
 A program supported by the World Bank. For more information, see http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P071794/rural-
electrification-renewable-energy-development?lang=en  
6
 Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, as of June 2011. 
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by 2016, from 7,000 megawatts (MW) in 2012 to 14,000 MW by 2016 (figure 4) 7. Despite these 
investments and growth in supply, demand has continued to outstrip supply.  
Figure 4: supply and demand, and current fuel sources 
 
As part of that plan, a number of large gas-fired power plants have recently been awarded to the private 
sector; it will be a few more years before the plants are operational. Indeed, Bangladesh continues to 
rely on natural gas as its most important source of energy for electricity generation (figure 4). As an 
interim measure, the GOB has contracted rental plants with combined power of 2,500 MW, and by the 
end of 2011, these plants were supplying over 1,700 MW of power to help relieve power shortages.  
3.3 Toward universal access to electricity  
The GOB has a policy goal of universal access by 2020. According to the HIES (2010), 55 percent of 
households in Bangladesh report access to electricity.  
Figure 5: Electricity access by quintile 
 
Access, however, varies significantly by area and by quintile. Despite the REP, access rates remain much 
higher in urban areas compared to rural areas: 90 percent of urban households have electricity access 
compared to 43 percent of rural households (figure 5). Rural households in the poorest quintile have the 
                                                          
7
 For most up to date installed capacity data, see 
http://www.bpdb.gov.bd/bpdb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=150&Itemid=16 
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lowest levels of access: only one in five rural households in the poorest quintile has access to electricity 
(85 percent of households in the poorest quintile are rural).   
3.4 Electricity consumption profiles 
Analysis of household survey data suggest that over 80 percent of households, rich and poor, consumed 
less than 100 kWh per month in 2010 (figure 6), and accounted for almost 40 percent of total electricity 
consumed. Almost all households in the poorest quintile consume less than 100 kWh per month. The 
only exception is households in the richest quintile, of which the majority consume 100–300 kWh per 
month. Less than 2 percent of households in Bangladesh consume more than 300 kWh per month, while 
accounting for almost 10 percent of total electricity consumption.8  
Figure 6: Electricity consumption profiles by slab (Source: authors estimates based on HIES data)  
 
This means that using electricity subsidies as a social protection mechanism is limited: very low levels of 
access among poor households mean changes in electricity tariffs and subsidies will not affect them. 
This pattern of low consumption and low levels of access results in low levels of per capita consumption, 
which is consistent with global data. Bangladesh has one of the lowest per capita electricity 
consumption levels in the world. For example, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA)9, in 
2009, electricity consumption was 252 kilowatt hours (kWh) per capita (figure 7), compared to an 
average double that level for both sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (517 kWh per capita). 
  
                                                          
8
 See annex 3 for more detailed consumption analysis (split by rural/urban/urban Dhaka). 
9
 See http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp 
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Figure 7: Global electric power consumption 
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3.5 Brief overview of electricity tariffs in Bangladesh 
Residential electricity tariffs are structured by an incremental block tariff (IBT), with one set of tariffs for 
urban households and another for each of the distribution companies serving rural households. Note 
there are three slabs for urban households and four for rural households, as illustrated in table 110. 
Households only receive slab benefits for two slabs: the one where their final consumption falls, and the 
one previous. For example, an urban household consuming 450 kWh of electricity in March 2012, will be 
charged Tk 7.89 for the 50 units above 400, and Tk 4.29 for the first 400 units.  
Table 1. Price by Block, Tk/kWh 
 
March 2010 (Tk) 
Urban     
0–100 units  2.6  
101– 400 units  3.3  
> 400 units  5.65  
Rurala    
0–100 units  2.53–2.90  
101–300 units  2.57–2.95  
301–500 units  3.89–4.15  
> 500 units  4.99–5.95 
Cost of supply  3.8 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
a. There are several utility companies supplying rural households, so tariff 
ranges provided. 
3.6 Electricity subsidies in Bangladesh 
In this report, the electricity subsidy provided on each unit of electricity consumed by a household is 
measured by the difference between the prices households face (the tariffs charged) and the cost of 
supplying that electricity.  
Figure 8: Electricity Subsidies in Bangladesh 2010 (Urban)  
                                                          
10
 Note in the past a minimum charge of Tk 100 was in place. This is important since it strongly affects the average tariff paid by 
low consuming households. Based on input from a number of sources, this analysis assumes no minimum charge is in place, but 
this should be clarified for future analysis given conflicting reports on the existence of a minimum charge e.g. 
http://www.berc.org.bd/images/stories/pdf/existing_retail_tariff_w.e.f_01_september_2012.pdf  
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For varying levels of consumption, figure 8 illustrates the average tariff per kilowatt hour for urban 
households and the cost of supply. It shows that at low levels of consumption (below 100 kWh), the 
average tariff is Tk 2.6 against a cost of supply of Tk 3.8, meaning each unit under 100 kWh was 
subsidized Tk 1.2 (or 32 percent). Even at higher levels of consumption, electricity remains subsidized.  
Note that although the marginal tariff is above cost for consumption above 400 kWh (table 1), the 
average tariff only increases above cost of supply when a household consumes more than 550 kWh. This 
is because of slab benefits that were in place in 2010: all households benefit from the prices of all slabs 
independently of how much electricity they consume. 
Table 2. Regional Comparison of Electricity Costs  
 
Calculating the cost of 100 kWh of electricity for an urban household in March 2010 (table 2) in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India (using the representative state of Uttar Pradesh) provides a regional 
comparison. This basic indicator shows that urban residential households pay relatively less than similar 
households in neighboring countries, perhaps because they are more heavily subsidized.   
  
3
8
%
 o
f co
n
su
m
p
tio
n
 b
e
lo
w
 1
0
0
 k
W
h
Le
ss
 t
h
a
n
 1
0
%
 a
b
o
v
e
 4
0
0
 k
W
h
Subsidy Cross-Subsidy
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 200 400 600 800A
v
e
ra
g
e
 t
a
ri
ff
 (
2
0
1
0
 t
a
k
a
 p
e
r 
k
W
h
)
Monthly consumtpion (kWh)
Average tariff 2010
Cost of Supply 2010
What is a subsidy?
• Subsidy: for units of 
electricity consumed 
where the tariff is 
below the cost of 
supply, households 
are receive a 
subsidy from the 
state
• Cross-subsidy: for 
units consumed 
where the tariff is 
above the cost of 
supply, households 
are paying a cross-
subsidy
 For 100 kWh of electricity consumption for an urban household in 2010  
 Electricity bill (Tk) Supply cost (Tk) Subsidy (Tk) Subsidy as % cost 
Pakistan 322 752 429 57 
India, Uttar Pradesh 366 544 178 33 
Bangladesh 260 380 120 32 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
2013 The transition from underpricing electricity in Bangladesh: fiscal and distributional impacts 
 
12  
 
4 Distribution Analysis of Electricity Subsidies 
One of the main arguments for providing subsidies is that they provide social protection for poor 
households. Given the high cost of providing these subsidies and the fiscal burden they place on the 
government, it is especially important to understand how the benefits are distributed among different 
income quintiles to assess the efficiency in targeting poor households.  
Before analyzing the distribution of benefits, there are two important aspects to analyze that will affect 
the distribution of subsidies: the depth and width of subsidies, and the degree of cross-subsidization 
from high-consuming households to low-consuming households.  
4.1 Width versus depth of subsidies 
One of the key questions that emerge when consumption patterns are 
overlaid on the existing tariff structure (figure 8) is how wide and how 
deep electricity subsidies are. 
Figure 7 illustrated that 90 percent of electricity consumption is below 400 
kWh, while it is only above 400 kWh that the marginal price is above cost 
(table 1). This means that 90 percent of electricity consumed by residential 
households was subsidized to some extent in 2010. Note this width of 
subsidies will limit the ability to offset the fiscal burden through cross-
subsidies from high consumers to low consumers. 
In terms of depth, the consumption of the average connected household 
was subsidized 25 percent in 2010. The average connected household spent Tk 281 consuming 149 kWh 
of electricity that cost Tk 373 to supply. This means the average connected household therefore 
received Tk 90 in subsidies (or 25 percent of the 
cost of supply). 
4.2 From gross to net: the limited 
impact of cross-subsidies in 
Bangladesh 
One of the design features in an IBT structure is 
that high-consuming households pay above the 
cost of supply for their high levels of consumption, 
providing a cross-subsidy and helping to offset 
some of the cost of providing subsidies. This is an 
important factor to consider in relation to the 
fiscal burden of subsidies.  
As described above, approximately 90 percent of electricity units consumed in 2010 were subsidized to 
some extent. This limits the impact of cross-subsidies in Bangladesh which is illustrated on Figure 9. 
Width: proportion of 
electricity units 
consumed that receive 
some level of subsidy 
Depth: the degree to 
which the average 
connected household 
was subsidized 
Figure 9: Gross to net electricity subsidy for the 
average connected household (2010). Source: 
authors estimates based on HIES  
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Cross-subsidies are the difference between the gross cost of subsidies (before cross-subsidies are taken 
into account) and the net cost (after cross-subsidies are taken into account).  
On a gross basis, the average connected household received Tk 95 in March 2010, which reduces only 
marginally to Tk 92 on a net basis. Most of the cross-subsidies come from high consuming households 
which tend to be urban households in the richest quintile. The very limited consumption at high levels 
means cross-subsidies only reduced the fiscal burden of subsidies by 4 percent; this is important for the 
distributional analysis because it implies that rich households on net still receive significant subsidies.  
4.3 Distributional analysis of electricity subsidies 
A distributional analysis allows us to estimate how the benefits provided through subsidies are 
distributed among different quintiles in Bangladesh. The key objectives of this analysis are (i) to 
understand how well the subsidy is targeted to the intended beneficiaries and (ii) how much leakage 
there is from these intended beneficiaries to others. 
Figure 10: Distributional Analysis of Electricity Subsidies in Bangladesh, 2010. Source: World Bank 
Analysis  
 
Rich households receive overwhelmingly more of the subsidy benefits than do households in the 
poorest quintile. Households in the richest quintile receive seven times more than households in the 
poorest quintile (42 percent versus 6 percent, figure 10). This means that not only are the subsidies not 
well targeted, but there is significant leakage to households that arguably have less need for subsidy 
support.  
There are at least three important factors producing this result (figure 11). First, the very low electricity 
access rate among poor households limits the ability of subsidies to reach them. Only 27 percent of 
households in the poorest quintile had access to electricity in 2010. Second, as discussed above, 
consumption levels are low, meaning a significant proportion (almost 40 percent) of electricity is 
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Figure 11: Key Factors contributing to 
unequal distribution of electricity 
subsidies. Source: authors illustration 
 
Only 27 percent of households in the 
poorest quintile have access to 
electricity. These low access rates 
limits the ability for electricity subsidy 
benefit poor households
Almost 40% of consumption is by 
households consuming less than 100 
kWh, where consumption is highly 
subsidized (over 30% of the cost is 
subsidized)
Limited cross-subsidization from rich 
households to poor households i.e. a 
high threshold for cost-recovery 
pricing
consumed by households in the deeply subsidized 
slab (less than 100 kWh). Third, and related, because 
of this low consumption, cross-subsidies from rich 
households to poor households are limited. The 
typical international experience is that higher levels of 
consumption are priced above the threshold for cost-
recovery pricing, meaning enough households 
consume above the threshold, helping to offset 
subsidies paid at low levels of consumption. In 
Bangladesh, as illustrated in figure 8, there is very 
limited cross-subsidization taking place because so 
few households consume above the threshold for 
cost-recovery pricing.  
4.4 The relative value of subsidies 
An important final comment on the distribution of 
benefits is the degree to which subsidies represent an 
important source of value to households. In an abstract sense, a poor household may value Tk 100 in 
subsidies more highly than a rich household. While it is difficult to measure this sense of value, one 
proxy could be the scale of the subsidy provided in relation to total household spending. 
For households consuming electricity in March 2010, the value of subsidies provided to households were 
worth almost 2 percent of total household spending for the average household in the poorest quintile, 
compared to only 1 percent for the richest quintile. Therefore while poor households receive much less 
of a subsidy, it represents a higher proportion of their overall spending, so it could be more important to 
them. This is an important consideration, particularly with respect to the political economy of subsidy 
reform.   
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5  Key Changes in the Electricity Sector in 2010–12 
This section will briefly outline four key changes in the electricity sector relevant to the distribution of 
and fiscal burden of residential electricity subsidies: 
 the increase in cost of electricity supply;  
 the increase in tariffs;  
 the removal of slab benefits; and 
 the increase in electricity consumption.  
While these changes have different directional impacts on the distribution and fiscal burden of subsidies 
(for example, increase in the cost of supply will tend to increase the fiscal burden, while removal of slab 
benefits will tend to decrease the fiscal burden), the analysis will show that on net, subsidies have 
increased between 2010 and 2012 as a result of these changes.  
5.1 Increase in cost of electricity supply  
The cost of electricity supply is a critical component for determining the level of subsidization within 
each Distributing Company (DISCO). While tariffs increased substantially in nominal terms between 2010 
and 2012, the cost of electricity supply increased over 80 percent between July 2010 and March 2012 
(from Tk 2.96 to Tk 5.47 per kWh), or around 50 percent in real terms.  
There are two main factors behind this increase; the first is increasing prices in global energy markets. 
Natural gas remains the primary fuel source for electricity generation, and while Bangladesh has 
significant domestic reserves, the GOB has increased gas prices along with global price increases11. 
Figure 12 illustrates that during July 2010–March 2012, cost of supply increased 50 percent in real 
terms, which is very comparable to increases in global energy prices over the same period.  
Figure 12: Cost of Electricity Supply in Bangladesh vs Global Energy Prices (in July 2010 prices, indexed)
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The second factor is the high cost of rental power plants. By the end of 2011, 27 rental and quick rental 
power plants had come online: 7 quick rental power plants with a generation capacity of 522 MW, and 
20 rental plants with a production capacity of 1,173 MW. Most are diesel fired or furnace oil run, which 
increases the cost of supplying electricity. According to some reports, the Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB) has been purchasing electricity at Tk 13 to Tk 14 per unit from new diesel-
fired rental and quick rental power plants, and at around Tk 7 per unit from new furnace oil–run power 
plants. The electricity purchase rate from gas-fired independent power producer (IPP) power plants is 
around Tk 2.12  
5.2 Increase in tariff levels 
Partly in response to this rising cost of supply, along with a drive toward cost recovery, the government 
of Bangladesh increased tariffs significantly between 2010 and 2012. The focus of tariff increases has 
been in high levels of consumption (40–60 percent increase at the higher levels of consumption, table 
3), and further increases are expected as the government transitions from underpricing electricity 
towards cost recovery pricing.  
Table 3. Price by Block, Tk/kWh (rates in current taka) 
 
2005 March 2010 February 2011 March 2012 
Nominal 
increase 
(% 2010–
12) 
Urban           
0–100 units 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.05 17 
101–400 units 3 3.3 3.47 4.29 30 
> 400 units 5 5.65 5.93 7.89 40 
      Rural           
0–100 units 
 
2.53–2.90 2.64–3.03 3.08–3.55 23 
101–300 units 
 
2.57–2.95 2.95–3.39 3.67–4.20 42 
301–500 units 
 
3.89–4.15 4.49–4.78 5.98–6.35 53 
> 500 units 
 
4.99–5.95 5.92–7.05 7.88–9.38 58 
Cost of supply  3.8 4.15 5.47 44 
 
Trend of increasing tariffs: nominal versus real 
Tariffs have increased significantly in nominal terms between 2010 and 2012, by up to at least 15 
percent for the lowest slabs and up to 60 percent in the higher consumption slabs. However, with high 
rates of inflation, tariff increases have not been so large in real terms. According to the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), prices increased by more than 20 percent between March 2010 and March 2012. This means 
                                                          
12
 See http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?news_id=98188&date=2011-12-21.  
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that tariffs at the higher slabs increased less than 30 percent in real terms, and urban households 
consuming less than 100 kWh per month actually experienced a real decrease.  
5.3 Removal of slab benefits  
A second key change in pricing along in the transition from underpricing has been the removal of slab 
benefits. In 2010, all households benefited from all slabs. This meant that a household consuming 500 
kWh benefited from the low tariffs at low levels of consumption, for example, at 100 kWh. From March 
2010, slab benefits were removed for households consuming more than 300 kWh (urban and rural). This 
volume-based tariff applies a fixed rate to all levels of consumption. If this is applied to the figure used 
previously (based on average tariff), the new tariff system means there are significant “steps” at the slab 
boundaries, as illustrated in figure 13. 
Figure 13: Electricity Subsidies in Bangladesh 2010-12 (Urban, 2010 taka per kWh). Source: authors 
compilation 
 
The combination of higher tariffs and the removal of slab benefits resulted in significant increases in 
electricity bills. Most households have experienced at least a 17 percent increase in their bills during the 
two year period. However, wealthy households have been hardest hit by the increases, with some 
household bills more than doubling (figure 14). There has been strong public outcry in response to these 
sharp increases in electricity bills,13 which adds to the political economy considerations the government 
must factor as it contemplates further tariff reform.  
  
                                                          
13
 For example, see http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=238636. 
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Figure 14 Example Electricity Bills, 2010–12. Source: Authors’ illustration 
 
 
5.4 Increase in electricity consumption  
At least two factors have contributed to the 20 percent increase in consumption reported in 
administrative records14: 
 The Rural Electrification Program (REP): The ongoing REP is part of the government’s strategy to 
achieve universal access. According to administrative records, there was an 8 percent increase in 
the number of rural households connected between 2010 and 2012. 
 Increased generation capacity: figure 4 illustrates that electricity consumption is constrained by 
supply (hence the need for load shedding). In this context, any increase in generation capacity 
will translate into increased consumption.  
The analysis that follows estimates 2012 consumption based on these trends observed in administrative 
data. It suggests that 14 percent of the electricity consumed in 2012 was by households consuming 
more than 400 kWh, compared to 9 percent in 2010.  
To summarize, there are four key factors that will influence the subsidies analysis that follows. Between 
2010 and 2012:  
(i) cost of supply increased 20 percent in real terms; 
(ii) tariffs increased (though decreased in real terms at low levels of consumption); 
(iii) slab benefits were removed; and 
(iv) consumption increased 20 percent. 
                                                          
14
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6  2010 versus 2012: The Distribution and Fiscal Burden of Subsidy 
Benefits 
This section will discuss the impact of the changes described in section five. It will look at the impact on 
the distribution of benefits and on the fiscal burden. This section will also disaggregate the change in 
fiscal burden by each of the changes described in section five. Results show that the cost of supply was a 
key factor in the increase of the fiscal burden, although the removal of slab benefits helped to limit this 
increase.  
6.1 More cross-subsidies, but higher net subsidies 
Electricity was subsidized as deeply and almost as widely in 2012 as in 2010. In both years, almost all 
electricity units consumed (80–90 percent) were subsidized to some extent. Depth remained around 25 
percent in 2012, although there was a change in the underlying pattern of subsidies. For low levels of 
consumption, virtually stagnant real tariffs coupled with a soaring real cost of supply (figure 13) meant 
that the degree of subsidy provided on each unit of electricity almost doubled in real terms. On the 
other hand, the cross-subsidy provided through high levels of consumption increased dramatically with 
the removal of slab benefits.  
The net effect of these opposing forces was neutral in terms of average degree of subsidization. 
However, the amount of cross-subsidization did increase as a result of tariff and consumption increases, 
but not enough to offset the effects of the rising cost of supply and consumption at lower levels, so net 
subsidies increased. Figure 15 illustrates this for the average connected household. In 2010, this 
household received 95 taka in gross subsidies, paid 4 taka in cross subsidies, and so received 92 taka in 
net subsidies. In 2012, the cross-subsidy increased to 5 taka, but on a gross subsidy of 123 taka, meaning 
the net subsidy received was 118 taka (up from 92 taka in 2010). 
Figure 15: Gross to net electricity subsidy for the average connected household, 2010 vs 2012. Source: 
authors estimates based on HIES data 
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6.2 Distribution of subsidy benefits improving, though more expensive 
Figure 16 illustrates that the distribution of benefits improved between 2010 and 2012. Overall, the 
distribution was more equal in 2012, with the increased cross-subsidies paid by rich household reducing 
the net subsidies they receive by almost half. While the share received by poor households also 
improved, they still only receive around one-third of the benefits of households in the top two quintiles. 
This suggests that there remains significant leakage.   
Figure 16 Benefits Incidence of Electricity Subsidies in Bangladesh, Source: authors estimates based on 
HIES data 
 
The second critical question to analyze is the fiscal burden of subsidies. This is particularly important in 
the context of a difficult and deteriorating overall fiscal position in Bangladesh. According to the most 
recent IMF estimations for Bangladesh, the fiscal deficit will increase from 3.1 percent of GDP in FY2010 
to 4.4 percent of GDP in FY2012. A key driver of this increasing deficit is subsidies provided for various 
needs in the country.  
Electricity subsidies include subsidies provided to households (residential subsidies) as well as to other 
sectors (for example, agricultural subsidies)—the focus here is on residential subsidies. According to this 
analysis, the real fiscal burden of residential subsidies increased by over 40 percent between 2010 and 
2012.  
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6.3 Disaggregation of change in fiscal burden 
The major contributing factor was the increased cost of electricity supply, which increased the fiscal 
burden by 75 percent (figure 17). Increased consumption increased the fiscal burden by a further 29 
percent. These increases were offset to some extent by tariff increases between 2010 and 2012, which 
helped to reduce the fiscal burden by 12 percent, and the removal of slab benefits, which reduced the 
fiscal burden by a further 52 percent. On net, the fiscal burden increased by 41 percent.  
Figure 17: Disaggregation of change in fiscal burden, 2010-2012 
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7 Moving Forward: Scenarios of Policy Options 
This section briefly explores five policy-relevant scenarios using a partial equilibrium analysis that 
includes policies already being pursued by the GOB, for example, the trend toward cost-recovery pricing 
and the push toward achieving universal electrification. The results suggest that the move toward cost-
recovery pricing will help reduce the leakage and inefficiency of subsidies, but subsidies will always have 
some degree of leakage and inefficiency.  
7.1 Overview of scenarios  
The scenario analysis looks at the impact of various policy choices available to the government in the 
short term (that is, next 12 months), as well as policy choices that could be implemented in the medium 
(3–5 years) and long term (5–10 years).  
Table 4. Policy Option Summary. Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Table 4 summarizes the changes modeled in each scenario. Further discussion of below the poverty line 
(BPL) tariffs can be found in annex 4, while the seven and nine slab systems being discussed at the time 
of this paper are captured in table 5.  There are at least two new slab systems being considered; both 
would have limited or no slab benefits, but would help avoid the “jumps” in electricity bills experienced 
in the current slab structure when households move from one slab to the next (figure 13).  
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TERM
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TERM
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TERM
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Scenario 
1
Scenario 
2
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3
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4
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5
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6
Scenario 
7
Scenario 
8
Scenario 
9
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Urban Tariff Structure
2012 structure
Proposed seven slab system
Proposed nine slab system
Social tariffs
Rural Tariff Structure
2012 structure
Proposed seven slab system
Proposed nine slab system
20% lower than proposed nine slab system
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Cost of supply
March 2010
March 2012
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2012
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Table 5. Comparison of Seven and Nine Slab Systems  
 
Source: BERC 
7.2 Scenario results 
Table 6 summarizes the scenario results, with detailed output provided in annex 5.  
Table 6. Summary of Scenarios.  Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
 
All scenarios would improve the targeting efficiency of subsidies provided that households in the 
poorest quintile receive at least 10 percent of benefits. While these represent an improvement over 
2012, most scenarios in the short run would still have significant leakage, although the fiscal burden 
could be reduced significantly.  
 
In the medium term, perhaps the most effective policy measure would be to reduce the cost of supply 
to 2010 levels. While issues of generation cost and operational efficiency are outside the scope of this 
Seven slab system
No slab benefits
Slab Proposed Tariff
0-75 3.66
75-200 5.32
0-300 5.53
0-400 5.75
0-600 9.39
0-800 9.78
>800 9.94
Nine slab system
Slab benefits only to 300 kWh
Slab Proposed Tariff
0-75 4.56
76-200 5.16
201-300 5.45
0-400 7.63
0-500 7.66
0-600 7.98
0-700 8.76
0-800 9.35
>800 9.9
Scenario Description
Proportion of 
benefits 
received by 
poorest quintile
Fiscal burden as 
% of 2012
BASELINE 9% 100%
1 New slab system (seven) for urban only 14% 43%
2 New slab system (seven) for urban & rural 15% 22%
3 Nine slab schedule for urban only 14% 37%
4 Nine slab schedule for urban and rural 16% -2%
5 Nine slabs with rural tariffs 20% lower 15% 10%
6 2010 cost of supply 13% 35%
7 BPL tariffs / at least cost recover for all other households 52% -34%
8 Access 2020 (universal access) with current tariffs 15% 174%
9 Access 2020 - nine slab structure with rural 20% lower 25% 45%
10 Access 2020 scenario 9 with 2010 cost of supply 48% -56%
Richest 
Quintile
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policy note, it is important for the government to explore these issues in depth to understand the extent 
to which it can justify passing on cost of supply increases to households.  
 
In the long term, scenario 8 (achieving universal access under the current tariff structure) illustrates the 
need for the GOB to take action. Under this scenario, the fiscal burden would almost double its current 
levels.  
 
The only scenarios where leakage is significantly reduced are the long-term options of introducing a BPL 
tariff, or achieving universal access while also reducing cost of supply to 2010 levels and introducing the 
nine slab system currently being discussed. Both options (scenarios 7 and 9) would see the households 
in the poorest quintile receive around 50 percent of subsidies provided. Further, the fiscal burden in 
both scenarios would not only be cut completely, but a net fiscal gain would be generated through 
cross-subsidies, meaning that additional resources could be available for infrastructure improvements.  
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8  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The electricity sector in Bangladesh faces unprecedented challenges, with severe capacity constraints 
and sector subsidies, which quadrupled from 0.2 percent to 0.8 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2012, 
driving the government’s fiscal deficit deeper. Subsidies provided to residential households are an 
important component of broader electricity subsidies, which also include subsidies to the agriculture 
sector. 
There is significant leakage of residential electricity subsidies: households in the richest quintile received 
seven times as much in electricity subsidies as households in the poorest quintile (42 percent of 
subsidies versus 6 percent) in 2010. The three key factors contributing to this result are:  
(i) access rates have remained low in Bangladesh (55 percent for all Bangladesh, only 20 percent 
for rural poor); 
(ii) consumption patterns—in 2010 almost 40 percent of electricity consumed was by households 
consuming less than 100 kWh, where electricity was highly subsidized (over 30 percent of the 
cost of electricity was subsidized); and 
(iii) the threshold for cost-recovery pricing—the level of consumption above which consumers pay 
at or above cost—is currently high in Bangladesh, only 1 percent of electricity consumption is 
above the threshold, that is, 99 percent of electricity units are subsidized.  
Leakage of subsidies improved between 2010 and 2012, mainly due to the removal of slab benefits for 
higher levels of consumption, meaning households in the richest quintile provided cross-subsidies to 
households in lower quintiles.  
Meanwhile, the fiscal burden of subsidies increased 41 percent in real terms, mainly because of a 20 
percent increase in consumption—the result of increased generation capacity and the ongoing rural 
electrification program has increased access—and increases in the cost of supply, since the generation 
increase has mostly come from expensive furnace oil rental power plants. 
In the short term, any of the new slab structures being considered will help reduce the fiscal burden 
significantly. In the medium term, reducing the cost of supply, by reducing generation costs through new 
power plants, and improving operational efficiency, will reduce fiscal burden and subsidy leakage. 
In the long term, achieving universal access would increase the fiscal burden further. The new tariff 
structure, BPL tariffs like those found in many states in India, and reduced cost of supply are all policy 
options for the GOB to consider to mitigate fiscal burden and leakage. 
Athought this policy report carried out analysis on the technical dimension of electricity pricing and 
subsidies, there remain several factors that are crucial for implementing the electricity subsidy reform. 
First, it has not discussed the financial aspect of the electricity sector, inlcuding sector losses and fiscal 
transfer mechanisms. These issues should be studied as part of a broader energy sector review, and 
public expenditure review.  
2013 The transition from underpricing electricity in Bangladesh: fiscal and distributional impacts 
 
26  
 
Second, perhaps the most difficult aspect of electricity tariff and subsidy reform is the political economy 
of reform. Electricity tariffs affect a large proportion of the voting electorate, and often households with 
a stronger political voice. Recent public outcry at tariff increases illustrates the tension that exists, and is 
especially important when considering recent reports that the GOB is considering increasing tariffs a 
further 50 percent.  
A number of other factors are also important to be examined as part of a boarder package on pricing 
and subsidy reform. First is the public communication dimension. Recent experiences of substantial 
subsidy reform such as those seen in Iran15 provide a good example of placing a high emphasis on 
managing public expectations and engaging in a highly visible communication and education program. 
Second, the timing and sequencing of reforms is important. Recent tariff increases have been substantial 
n Bangladesh and over a short period of time. Experiences of tariff reform in other countries16, for 
example Laos, provide an example of a slow and steady approach to tariff reform. In the case of Laos 
which chose to transition to cost recovery pricing in 2005, the government implemented the change 
over a period of five to six years17. Tariff increases can be more palatable politically when introduced 
steadily and gradually over time, and when households can see the benefits (for example, higher quality 
supply, more households connected etc.). These factors should be included in a political economy 
analysis of any further pricing and subsidy policy changes.  
  
                                                          
15
 See Guillaume 2011 
16
 The case studies documented by the Global Subsidies Initiative may be useful in this regard. See 
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/fossil-fuel-subsidies  
17
 See page 64, World Bank 2006 
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Annexes 
Annex 1  Structure of Power Sector 
The power sector is organized under the Ministry of Power, Energy, and Mineral Resource (MoPEMR). 
The ministry manages the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDP), the Dhaka Electricity Supply 
Authority (DESA), and the Rural Electrification Board (REB). BPDP is by law responsible for generation 
and transmission of power while distribution has the responsibility of different government 
corporations. The government also allows private power generation. As part of the 1998 sector reforms, 
new public entities such as Power Grid Company of Bangladesh (PGCB), and Dhaka Electric Supply Co. 
Ltd (DESCO) as well as private sector IPPs have been constituted.  
Key milestones 
Figure A1 
 
  
1977
Until 1977, BPDB was 
the sole agency 
responsible for 
generation, 
transmission, and 
distribution of 
electricity in the 
country. Reforms in 
the sector started in 
1977 through the 
creation of REB to 
initiate rural 
electrification
1991
No further reform took 
place until 1991, when 
the DESA was created 
to take over the 
distribution system of 
Dhaka from BPDB as 
part of the unbundling 
process
1992
Sector was 
opened to 
private 
investment
1995
Power Cell 
was formed 
to design, 
facilitate, and 
drive reform 
measures
1996
• The National Energy Policy was 
adopted for the overall development 
of the sector
• To introduce competition, bring in 
foreign capital, and increase power 
supply, the Private Sector Power 
Generation Policy was adopted 
• As part of the unbundling, PGCB was 
formed to take over the transmission 
business from BPDB
• DESCO was formed to take over part 
of the distribution business of Dhaka 
city from DESA
2003 
Bangladesh Energy Regulatory 
Commission (BERC) through a 
legislative Act to regulate Gas, 
Electricity and Petroleum 
products. The mandate includes 
framing rules and regulation to 
ensure transparency in the 
management, operation and 
tariff determination in 
electricity, gas and petroleum 
sector; and to protect consumer 
and industry interest and 
promote a competitive market. 
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Figure A2 
 
 
Power Distribution 
Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) 
Responsible for distribution in urban areas except metropolitan area of Dhaka and its adjoining area. 
Dhaka is the commercial heart of Bangladesh with many large business corporations and large and small 
industries located here. There is a good mix of consumers like commercial, industrial and residential.   
 
Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority (DESA)  
Responsible for distribution in greater Dhaka area. 
 
Dhaka Electric Supply Co. Ltd (DESCO) 
Responsible for distribution in Mirpur area of Metro area of Dhaka in Greater Dhaka. It purchases power 
from DESA. 
 
Dhaka Power Distribution Co. Ltd. (DPDC) 
The largest power distribution company in the country, responsible for distribution in metropolitan 
areas. 
 
Rural Electricity Board (REB)  
Responsible for distribution in rural areas of Bangladesh through a system of cooperatives known as Palli 
Biddyut Samities (PBS). It purchases power from BPDB and DESA. Rural Bangladesh is primarily 
agricultural with some engaged in small scale industries thus, the consumer mix of REB is mostly 
agricultural in nature 
 
Ministry of Power, Energy 
and Mineral Resources
Power Cell
Electrical Advisor and Chief 
Electrical Inspector (EA and CEI)
BPDB IPP Small IPP
PGCB
(an enterprise of BPDB)
BPDB
REB / 
PBSs
DPDCDESCO WZPDC
Generation
Transmission
Distribution
2013 The transition from underpricing electricity in Bangladesh: fiscal and distributional impacts 
 
30  
 
West Zone Power Distribution Co. Ltd (WZPDCL)  
Under BPDB, it is responsible for power distribution in Khulna and Barisal regions. Both Khulna and 
Barisal are predominantly agricultural areas with lot of jute and rice production in these areas. The 
demand for electricity is both for agriculture as well as for industrial especially in Khulna which has many 
large jute mills. 
 
North West Zone Power Distribution Co. Ltd (NWZPDCL)  
Under BPDB, it is responsible for power distribution in Rajshahi and Rangpur (formerly a part of 
Rajshahi) regions. Rajshahi has been regarded as the bread-basket of Bangladesh. With recent 
agricultural modernizations and agro-processing (which has an extremely bright future in this region of 
the country) there is a huge amount of agricultural demand for electricity here. 
 
South Zone Power Distribution Company Ltd (SZPDCL)  
Under BPDB, it is responsible for power distribution in Chittagong and Comilla regions. Around 40 
percent of the heavy industrial activities of the country are located in Chittagong city and adjacent 
areas. Chittagong is the site of Bangladesh's busiest port which handles 80 percent of all Bangladeshi 
imports and exports. The strategic location of the port has allowed for interest by investors to help 
improve the city. Thus a major electricity demand comes from the industrial consumers. 
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Annex 2  Technical Notes on Benefits Analysis Methodology 
We estimate the HH subsidy using electricity utility data (for example, tariff structure, cost of supply, 
and others) and electricity consumption data in the 2010 Household Income Expenditure Survey (HIES). 
This relies on making a number of assumptions, which are discussed in the following methodology.  
First spatially adjusted quintiles are defined based on consumption levels. Second, the sample is 
cleaned. The HIES survey includes 12,600. We remove 460 observations (3.7 percent) whose reported 
electricity expenditure is not possible given the tariff structure. For example, with the minimum charge 
of 100 taka in effect in March 2010, households with a valid connection couldn’t spend less than 100 
taka. We assume these observations are due to either reporting error, or that they are illegal users (and 
so shouldn’t be counted as part of a subsidy analysis).  
Third, electricity consumption was estimated by applying the given tariff to the reported expenditure. 
We estimate electricity consumption from expenditure data (as consumption is not reported).  The 
following procedure was carried out: First, from the tariff structures, we calculated ranges of electricity 
expenditures that should belong to each slab18. For example, if an urban HH’s monthly electricity 
expenditure in 2010 is Tk 100, their electricity consumption belongs to the first slab and the marginal 
tariff is Tk 2.6 (table 1). Second, once we identify the slab that a HH belongs to, we apply the variable 
tariff for each segment of electricity consumption. For example, if an urban HH’s monthly expenditure in 
2010 is Tk 750, then this HH belongs to the second slab and the HH’s consumption is thus estimated as 
(750–260)/3.3 + 100. 
As a robustness check, consumption estimates were cross-checked against two sets of administrative 
data. At a high level, we compared monthly household consumption to per capita consumption reported 
by the International Energy Agency19 (box A1). Our estimates were comparable to IEA estimated. At a 
more granular level, we compared our estimates to administrative records (table A1). The biggest issue 
of under-reporting was for Urban Dhaka households. For example, we estimated 6 percent of total 
electricity consumed by urban Dhaka households is by households consuming more than 400 kWh in 
2010, while administrative data suggests this was 30 percent for 2010–11. This is likely due to under-
reporting for urban households in Dhaka within HIES (common to have issues with representative 
samples in urban areas). We tested a number of different factors to apply to Dhaka households to make 
an adjustment for under-reporting. A factor of 1.75 brought results to be comparable with 
administrative data, which would imply an under-reporting of 57 percent. Applying this factor brings 
consumption for Dhaka households >400 up to 24 percent, in line with administrative data (30 percent).  
Table A3 details all consumption estimates compared to administrative records after applying the 
adjustment factor. Better, the figure for the total consumption is much more consistent when taking this 
adjustment into account (all consumption brackets are within +/- 20 percent), and total consumption is 
in line with IEA estimates (of 250 kWh per capita per year).   
                                                          
18
 Note for rural consumers, we selected the mid-point of range of tariffs for rural households selected as the effective tariff for 
the purposes of the analysis. 
19
 http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp. 
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Figure A320 
 
Fourth, we estimated the subsidy by subtracting the cost of electricity supply.  
S = C – E 
C = U * Q 
Q = E / F 
S = subsidy 
C = cost of supply 
E = electricity expenditure 
U = unit cost of supply 
Q = quantity of electricity consumed 
F = tariff 
  
                                                          
20
 Notes 
• HIES is 2010, while BERC data is 2010–11. Given growth in consumption, we expect HIES to be lower than 
administrative records 
• Comparisons for sub-group indicative only: 
• For Dhaka analysis, District 26 & urban used to identify Dhaka households in HIES; DPDC administrative data 
used for comparison—will not match households exactly 
• For Rural household analysis, “rural” identifier used for HIES, and REB administrative  
ALL URBAN RURAL
HIES estimate 
(2010)
Administrative 
data (2010-11
HIES estimate 
(2010)
Administrative 
data (2010-11
HIES estimate 
(2009-10)
Administrative 
data (2010-11
0-100 38% 46% 21% 26% 0-100 65% 76%
100-400 53% 41% 66% 57% 100-300 30% 18%
>400 9% 12% 13% 17% 300-500 4% 4%
>500 1% 1%
DHAKA
HIES estimate 
(2010)
Administrative 
data (2010-11
1% 3%
75% 66%
24% 30%
Box A1 
Robustness check: are HIES estimates consistent with IEA figures? 
 IEA is based on total power generated (that is, includes everything: residential, industry, and so forth) 
divided by total population. IEA report a figure of 250 kWh per capital for 2009 in Bangladesh.  
 HIES suggests monthly consumption is 50 kWh per household (or 90 kWh per connected household).  
 HIES 50 kWh is almost exactly in line with the 250 kWh per capita per year figure from IEA. Why?  
 50 kWh per month = 600 kWh per year. The average household size in Bangladesh is 4.5 persons, so 
600 kWh per household = ~133 kWh per capita. Residential consumption represents around 50 
percent of total energy consumption, so total energy consumed per capita is around twice 133 i.e. 
266 kWh per capita in 2010; on par with the 250 kWh per capita in 2009 from IEA, that is, after 
considering growth in generation, access, and so forth.  
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Table A1. Domestic Consumption: 2010–11 
Utility Slab 
% Total consumption in 
each utility % of slab consumption 
 DESCO 0-100 1.50 3.10 49,256,329,452 
 
100-400 29.02 60.10 2,540,675,895 
 
>400 17.76 36.80 4,149,310,361 
 
Subtotal 48.28 100.00 1,526,946,213 
     DPDC 0-100 1.38 3.22 77,261,495 
 
100-400 28.46 66.64 1,598,977,025 
 
>400 12.87 30.14 723,186,788 
 
Subtotal 42.71 100.00 2,399,425,308 
     PDB 0-100 21.09 47.41 1,515,200,299 
 
100-400 22.18 49.85 1,593,181,500 
 
>400 1.22 2.74 87,569,053 
 
Subtotal 44.49 100.00 3,195,950,852 
     WZPDCL 0-100 22.38 48.00 396,392,331 
 
100-400 23.31 50.00 412,908,678 
 
>400 0.93 2.00 16,516,347 
 
Subtotal 46.62 100.00 825,817,356 
     REB Min 2.10 4.08 219,474,071 
 
0-100 37.49 72.89 3,922,937,338 
 
101-300 9.36 18.19 979,199,149 
 
301-500 1.95 3.79 204,091,537 
 
Above 500 0.54 1.05 56,543,332 
 
Subtotal 51.44 100.00 5,382,245,427 
     All Utilities 
 
46.35 6,178,597,504 
   
41.27 5,502,018,480 
   
12.38 1,649,769,170 
    
13,330,385,154 
Source: BERC.   
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The 2012 simulations summarized in the main body of this note and in more detail below (Annex 5) 
include consumption forecasts for 2012. These are based on observed overall trends in the energy 
sector (20 percent increase in overall demand) and the rural electrification program. The following 
process was applied. First, we assumed a ten percent increase in the number of rural households 
receiving electricity (in line with administrative records). For each of the newly connected households, 
we applied the average electricity consumption for rural households in 2010 (77 kWh). This resulted in 
an overall increase in electricity consumption of 4 percent. To adjust for the 20 percent increase 
observed at a macro level, we applied a 16 percent increase to all connected households (including the 
newly connected rural households). Households were then re-categorized into their relevant 
consumption slabs, and the relevant 2012 tariffs were applied for each simulation.   
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Annex 3  Detailed Consumption Analyses 
Figure A4 
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Annex 4 BPL Tariffs in India 
One option available to the Government of Bangladesh is below the poverty line (BPL) tariffs, which are 
widespread in neighboring India. BPL tariffs are typically highly subsidized tariffs that are only available 
to households below the poverty line. In India, implementation of BPL tariffs varies by state, but 
generally BPL households need to provide supporting documentation to qualify for the lower electricity 
tariffs. The lower tariff is also often contingent upon other household characteristics, such as total 
electricity consumption or number of electricity connections. These are funded through a combination 
of cross-subsidies from high consuming households, and transfers from the Ministry of Finance.  
 
This annex provides a brief overview of BPL tariffs in India.  
 
Prevalence of BPL tariffs  
As of 2004–2005, 11 states of 19 surveyed21 had a separate tariff schedule for BPL consumers. There 
were no “lifeline” tariffs (a special slab for any household with limited consumption). As of 2009–10, 17 
states of 26 surveyed22 had a separate tariff schedule for BPL consumers (13 of the 19 surveyed 
for2005). Two additional states (both included in the 2005 figure) had lifeline tariffs, and two states had 
both with BPL and lifeline tariffs.  
 
History of BPL tariffs  
The government of India does not have a central policy mandating subsidized tariffs for BPL consumers; 
however, it started encouraging such subsidies with the mid-2000s electricity reforms. The 2005 
National Electricity Policy (NEP) encouraged cost recovery in tariffs yet allowed that BPL consumers may 
receive subsidized tariffs. It suggests this subsidized consumption should be limited, potentially at 30 
units per month, but does not mandate such limitations, and limits the tariffs to no less than 50 percent 
of the average cost of supply.  
 
In practice, the effective subsidization rate varies substantially, and most states have not chosen to 
follow the 50 percent subsidization limit: 14 of the 2010 BPL tariffs were subsidized between 51 and 100 
percent. The limits also vary: 6 of the 2010 BPL schedules were unlimited for all BPL consumers; another 
6 were limited at the suggested 30 kWh per month; and the remaining ranged from limits of 25 to 200 
kWh per month.  
 
Prior to the NEP and other Acts, the Government of India does not appear to have had a stance on BPL 
tariffs. From 1989 to 2005, it had the “Kutir Jyoti Program”, which provided single-point light 
connections to all BPL consumers and gave a 100 percent grant for connection charges, but it did not 
cover or appear to mention tariffs. Despite this, some states (for example, Karnataka) had BPL tariffs as 
early as 1979.   
                                                          
21
 Surveyed states are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, and West 
Bengal.   
22
 Survey excluded Goa, Manipur, and Mizoram because their 2009–10 schedules were not available. 
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Annex 5  Detailed Scenario Results 
Figure A5 
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